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It takes much philosophical resolve to deny that animals 
feel their pains. After all, the evidence in its favor 
appears to be overwhelming. As Richard Sergeant 
observed. Every particle of factual evidence supports 
the contention Ulat the higher mammalian vertebrates 
experience pain sensations at least as acute as our own.! 
The behavioral evidence is indeed very strong: many 
animals behavejust as humans do when in contact with 
noxious stimuli. Pain-behavior includes not only cries 
and yelps, but also increased blood pressure, dilated 
pupils, etc. In addition, many animals have aneurological 
structure sufficiently like ours, including bOtll C- and 
A-fibers that serve as pain-transmitters, to warrant the 
belief that they feel their pains. And finally, as Gareth 
Matiliews has urged,2 evolution would lead us to expect 
apsychological continuity between ilie species; it would 
be surprising if among the creatures of tlle earUl only 
human beings were capable of feeling pain. 
Recent arguments by Peter Carruthers3 and by Peter 
Harrison4 have resurrected a Cartesian attitude toward 
animal pain. If their positions are sound, we are mistaken 
in thinking that animals can feel their pains: and 
consequently we are also mistaken in thinking Ulat 
animals could possibly be the appropriate objects of our 
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moral sympathies. In part I of this paper, I briefly describe 
Carruiliers' and Harrison's positions. In parts II and III, I 
show iliat ilieir Cartesian conclusions are unjustified. 
I. 
Harrison's and Carruthers' arguments are related but 
distinct. Harrison acknowledges that the case for animal 
pain appears strong but argues that critical reflection 
shows that there is plenty ofroom for doubt nonetheless. 
Carruthers claims that his account of conscious 
experience makes it implausible that nonhuman animals 
could be conscious of their experience generally, so iliey 
can't be conscious of ilieir pain states in spite ofapparent 
evidence to ilie contrary. Thus, they each contend that 
the prima/acie evidence for animal pain is outweighed 
by oilier considerations. Animals engage in pain­
behavior, they argue, but do not and indeed cannot/eel 
their pains. 
Harrison urges that behavioral and neurological 
evidences are insufficient to establish that a creature 
can feel its pain. First consider behavioral evidence. 
Even very simple organisms will withdraw from 
harmful stimuli, yet few are tempted to attribute 
conscious pain-states to such organisms. These creatures 
engage in behavior similar to what we associate wiili 
being in pain, but few would attribute conscious pain 
states to them on the basis of their behavior alone. The 
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adaptivity of the "pain" of animals, Harrison argues, is 
thus fully explicable in terms of pain-behavior, taking 
evasive action with respect to harmful stimuli, without 
the phenomenological quality of pain. 
Harrison further contends that the fact of neuro­
logical similarity between humans and animals does 
notforce the attribution of a genuine pain-state. Though 
many links between the brain and psychological 
experience are fairly well established, Harrison notes 
there is a plurality of cases that challenge any straight­
forward correspondence; so there's always room for 
doubt. His own suggestion is that consciousness ofpain 
is only properly attributable to rational agents: 
...while it is undeniable that animals sense 
noxious stimuli and react to them, these stimuli 
only need be represented as unpleasant mental 
states if they are to become the body's reasons 
in the context of other reasons. Only as various 
degrees of unpleasantness can they be taken 
seriously as amongst reasons, and this is only 
necessary in the mind of a rational agent.s 
The ability tofeel one's pain is tied up with the capacity 
to engage in practical reasoning. One must be able to 
use pain as among the individual's reasons in deciding 
what to do. Presumably, animals do not have the stuff of 
rational agents, so they can't feel their pains on Harrison's 
view. To be able to feel a pain, apparently, the concept of 
pain must have a meaning within an individual's 
cognitive framework. If animals do not feel their pain, 
animal pain could be classified as "unconscious 
experience." Harrison refers to Carruthers to support the 
plausibility of this controversial idea. 
Carruthers' contention is that all animal experience 
is unconscious. While this is certainly a strongly 
Cartesian-sounding thesis, it is still unlike Descartes 
in that Carruthers does not deny mental states or 
processes to nonhuman organisms.6 What Carruthers 
denies is that animals can be reasonably said to be 
conscious of the mental states that they have. Whereas 
Descartes took consciousness, or conscious thought, 
as definitive of mental states, Carruthers recognizes 
that many mental states are non-conscious. According 
to him, a conscious state is simply a mental state that 
is available for thought.7 This holds for beliefs as well 
as for experience. 
Carruthers' account is a variation of a standard 
characterization offered by David M. Armstrong: a 
mental state m is conscious if it causes a second-order 
belief in the existence of m.8 Thus, a creature might 
have a belief that plays a causal role in its behavior, 
but it is a conscious belief only if it also produces the 
belief in the existence of the first-order belief. 
Carruthers' account, however, does not demand 
higher-order beliefS in order to produce conscious 
states; but since conscious states must be available 
for thought, every conscious state requires higher­
order intentional mentality. And Carruthers takes it as 
axiomatic that animals could neither have beliefs or 
thoughts about their experience.9 
Since a conscious experience is one that can be 
thought about, and since it is implausible, according to 
Carruthers, to hold that animals can think about their 
experience, it follows that they have no conscious 
experience at all. There is, on this view, nothing that it 
is like to be a bat or any other nonhuman animal. 
Carruthers provides additional support for Harrison's 
controversial suggestion that only thinking beings can 
be aware of their pains. 
If all animal experience is unconscious, then, of 
course, animal pain is unconscious. lO The notion of 
unconscious pain is initially quite counterintuitive. 
Indeed consciousness seems to be central to our 
understanding of experience generally. However, there 
are common examples from human experience that seem 
to support it. For example, Rosenthal points out that 
we are often temporarily distracted from our headaches, 
and so become at least momentarily unconscious of 
them. ll We don't say, in such cases, that we've had 
several distinct headaches throughout the day; rather, 
we seem to acknowledge that we can become 
temporarily unconscious of the headache pain.12 
And there are examples, as Carruthers is quick to 
point out, of perceptual behavior without the usual 
attendant subjective qualities, such as human blind­
sightedne~s.13 In such cases, individuals apparently are 
perceiving, but the perception seems best characterized 
as unconscious. And, closer to home, there are examples 
ofpeople engaging in pain-behavior and later reporting 
they felt no pain, as under the conditions of an intense 
battle. Pain-behavior, according to Carruthers, requires 
perception, but perception need not be conscious: 
organisms can respond to perceptual cues in the 
environment without ever being aware that they are 
responding to them. 
One might object that if an organism is responding 
perceptually to cues, then it must be conscious of the 
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cues to which it is responding.14 Yet, it appears that 
humans respond unconsciously to perceptual cues 
regularly. Carruthers cites an example with which most 
are undoubtedly acquainted: driving an automobile over 
a familiar route while thinking and even daydreaming 
about other things. IS It may be that one cannot even 
remember any of the details of the route just driven. 
But then it appears that there are good grounds for 
saying that one was unconscious of driving throughout 
this tri~ven though one must have responded to 
perceptual cues along the way. 
The driving example describes a case ofuncolI1scious 
beliefs and desires, not unconscious pain. Nevertheless, 
the point is that the notion of an unconscious experience 
is familiar to us. Carruthers acknowledges that while it 
is part of the normal function of pain to "intrude upon 
consciousness in order to produce evasive action," an 
unconscious pain could, in principle, produce the 
evasive action without any conscious quality or without 
any conscious desire for the cessation of the pain. 
If Carruthers and Harrison are right, then there is 
some merit in denying that animals can be the objects 
of moral concern.16 By most accounts, the moral 
standing of animals depends upon their being able to 
have conscious experience, especially consciousness 
of pain; for the explanation of why pain is generally 
regarded as intrinsically bad is that the quality of the 
subjects' experience is aversive. On both Carruthers' 
and Harrison's views, animal "experience" has no 
subjective quality, so mere animal pain-behavior 
should be no cause for moral concern. It might be 
asked whether unconscious pain may somehow serve 
as a suitable basis for moral sympathy. The answer 
appears to be negative: pity is appropriate only when 
the object of pity has conscious states. Carruthers 
makes this clear by imagining a case analogous to 
blind-sightedness: 
Suppose that a particular subject, Mary, is 
never conscious of any pains in her legs. But 
when she suffers injury in that region, she 
displays much of normal pain behavior. Ifwe 
jab pins into her feet, she tends to try very hard 
to make us stop, she grimaces and groans, and 
severe damage causes her to scream. But she 
sincerely declares that she feels nothing. I? 
Were this case actual, we would surely have grounds 
for moral pity even though Mary doesn't feel the pain. 
T,tfitoria{
 
Substantially aided by a $1,000 grant from the 
Animal Protection Institute suggested by 
Cheryl Mouras, the first issue of Between the 
Species appeared as "1984 Winter 1985" at 
Thanksgiving, 1984. Steve and I wanted not to 
have to produce a second issue almost immedi­
ately after the first. Now it is Winter 1995. By 
the calendar we have completed the first ten 
years of publishing the journal. In fact, of 
course, readers will only recently have received 
Volume 9 Number 4 (Fall, 1993). During most 
of the years of BTS, publication of the journal 
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In late 1984 Steve bought a new ball for his 
dot-matrix printer, and dedicated part of his 
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would appear in BTS. These he would print out 
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existed a year ago. Professor Miller now scans 
many of the' manuscripts, spell-checking and 
proofing them also. Mter the first few years it 
(continued on page 80) 
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The tragedy of this situation would only seem slightly 
mitigated by the absence of conscious pain. But as 
Carruthers urges, 
We might perhaps feel sympathy for her 
general condition, since it is in many ways a 
disturbing situation in which to find oneself. 
But we should not feel sympathy on specific 
occasions of injury, since it is clear that she 
does not suffer. Not being conscious of any 
pain, her mental state is not an appropriate 
object of moral concern. IS 
Carruthers' goes on to point out that the fact that 
Mary's "suffering" is an indirect consequence of her 
injury: many of her desires, including the desire to walk 
freely, would be frustrated. So, Mary is unhappy, and 
her unhappiness is appropriate for our moral concern. 
But Mary's unhappiness is caused by her being 
conscious of her situation. If my car is similarly 
inoperable, pity would be misdirected at it (though it 
might well be directed at me) because the car is not 
conscious of its condition: the car's condition would 
not cause a frustration of any of its desires, since it has 
none. On Carruthers' account of consciousness, 
conscious states, whether of pain or anything else, are 
supposed to be impossible for animals. And moral pity 
cannot sensibly be directed towards individuals lacking 
consciousness. Thus, while moral pity may be 
appropriate for Mary (since she is conscious of her 
plight), such pity is not appropriate for a similarly 
situated non-eonscious creature. 
On both Carruthers' and Harrison's accounts then, 
it is the capacity for thought that provides the sole 
basis for a creature's faIling within the scope of 
morality: a creature counts morally only if it is 
conscious, and it is conscious only if it can engage in 
thought. And animals cannot think. Since they cannot 
think, their pain must be of the unconscious variety. 
But a creature's unconscious pain is ofmoral relevance 
only if, like Mary, the creature has conscious desires 
not to be in whatever state it is in. The reason that 
only conscious pain is morally relevant is that it has a 
quality that individuals generally desire to cease: when 
we are in pain, we generally seek relief. But 
unconscious pain has no quality whatsoever. And if a 
creature is not aware of its situation or aware of its 
pain, it's hard to see how one could owe any direct 
obligation to that creature. 19 
II. 
While Carruthers and Harrison may draw appropriate 
moral conclusions, they draw them from erroneous 
premises.2o Their arguments depend largely upon 
moving from the conceivability of some unconscious 
pain to the claim that animal pain in general must be 
unconscious. But the mere possibility that we can 
account for some pain as a type of unconscious 
perception is not sufficient to establish that animal pain 
is most plausibly interpreted in this way. 
The strategy employed by Harrison was to take up 
the considerations in favor of animal pain one by one 
and show that none implies that animals really feel their 
pains. While none of the arguments individually 
establishes that animals have pain, cumulatively they 
provide very strong support for the thesis. In a criminal 
investigation, no single piece of evidence typically 
established the guilt of the accused, but the combined 
force of evidence may well remove any reasonable 
doubt. Similarly, behavioral and neurological evidence 
together with arguments from evolution are sufficiently 
persuasive to remove all reasonable doubt with regard 
to the conscious pain of animals.21 
It is difficult to imagine pain having the survival 
value that it has for organisms if they were always 
unconscious of their pain. Carruthers himself acknow­
ledges, part of the normal functional role ofpain is that 
"it gives rise to a conscious desire that the pain should 
cease."22 Perhaps it's conceptually possible that pain 
could exist without this particular causal function, but 
it seemsprimafacie unlikely that this could be the nonn, 
given the functional role tllat pain has for survival.23 
The process of conditioning is utterly mysterious unless 
it is presupposed that stimuli can be felt. Indeed, it's 
hard to make sense of Harrison's acknowledgment that 
animals "sense noxious stimuli" [my emphasis], if they 
don't feel. What is this "sensing"? While pain behavior 
without the attendant consciousness of the pain is clearly 
imaginable, and in unusual cases has even occurred, the 
evidence suggests that such cases m~st be exceptional. 
Indeed the examples used to motivate the case for 
human unconscious perception typically involve the use 
of other conscious states. For example, once one has 
learned to drive and has become acquainted with a 
particular route (note that such learning experiences 
seem to require the conscious attention of the agent), 
one can begin to daydream, solve logic problems, or 
engage in other mental projects while one drives. Most 
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human beings are smart enough to carry on tllis sort of 
task wimout paying much aUention. Preswnably, a less 
illlellectually advanced individual must pay full 
attention to complete tlle job successfully. "Unconscious" 
behavior appears to be more of a case of intelligent 
cognitive economy within the stream of conscious 
experiences. Because he does not recognize this, 
Carrumers confuses being conscious of someming witll 
paying attention to sometlling of which one is already 
conscious. The capabiIily not to take note of one's 
perceptual experience seems to be best understood as 
the capacity to shift attention from perceptual 
experience to other matters. Unconscious behavior 
merefore, is for me most part a mauer ofdiverting one's 
attention from certain conscious experiences and 
focusing on omers. When I walk around tlle campus 
where I work, I am conscious of many sorts of tllings, 
but I focus my attention on just a few. It would just be 
wrong to say mat I am unconscious of tllOse things to 
which I don't focus my attention. My contention men 
is mat many of the alleged cases of "unconscious 
perception" could and should be similarly characterized 
as conscious after all. 
Related considerations hold for alleged instances of 
unconscious pain. Consider me headache example. My 
attention may well be directed away from my headache, 
but my headache need not be described as an instance 
of "unconscious pain" during these momentary 
distractions. Some might object that this is mere 
quibbling about how phenomena like me headache 
ought to be described.24 But even if me headache should 
count as unconscious pain, a headache that never 
impinged on consciousness would be no headache at all. 
The behaviors associated WillI having headaches would 
be utterly senseless unless mere is conscious pain. People 
typically do not continue to engage in pain-behavior while 
mey are unconscious of or distracted from their pain. 
And I see no reason why nonhuman animal experience 
need be any different than ours in this respect. The 
aversive subjective quality of pain is, after all, part of 
the functional role that pain plays. 11lis phenomenal 
quality provides me motivation to move away from 
dangerous stimuli. Consequently, while Harrison is 
correct in observing that it is the behavior of the 
organism that contributes to survival, rather tllClll its 
subjective states, it is normally difficult to account for 
pain-behavior in tlle absence of the experience of pain. 
In general, so-called unconscious pain is intelligible 
only in contexts where conscious pain can take place. 
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III. 
What I've tried to show so far is first, mat me cumulative 
argument in favor of conscious animal pain is stronger 
tllan eitller Harrison or Carrumers allow, and second, 
tllat many cases of apparent unconscious experience 
(including pain) are beuerdescribed as wimin me stream 
of consciousness. However mese considerations do not 
address the central contention that any sort of 
consciousness, including consciousness of pain, must 
involve me capacity to mink, a capacity animals are 
said to lack. In mis section I evaluate this claim. 
Recall Harrison's view that since mey can't think, 
animals can't use pain as a reason in deciding what to 
do. Harrison concentrates on cases in which humans 
bear pain for orner (more heroic) purposes and suggests 
tllat if animals can't bear pain for orner purposes men 
mey don't feel pain at all. But even if animals could 
not bear pain for orner purposes, it would not follow 
tllat tlley do not feel meir pains. There's someming very 
odd about saying mat me ability to feel pain depends 
upon one's ability to count pain as a reason. Indeed the 
decision to bear pain presupposes mat one is conscious 
of pain, but it's hard to see how me consciousness of 
pain presupposes any decisions at all. And me fact is 
that innumerable tests demonstrate mat animals will 
undergo painful stimuli to receive a desired reward. If 
a creature is initially shocked when auempting to take 
me food pellet and so refuses me next pellet mat is 
offered, why not say tllat it counts pain as a reason 
against retrieving the food pellet? Similarly, if il 
eventually retrieves the food pellet anyway, hasn't it 
born me pain for anomer purpose, just as humans do? 
Perhaps a stimulus-response story can be told about such 
cases that does not involve the attribution of any 
conscious states, though I think il's doubtful; but 
analogous stories can be told about the human cases as 
well. Skepticism about me subjective states ofothers is 
not limited by species. Humans are surely capable of 
reasoning wim respect to pain and many orner things 
in ways unavailable to most orner animals. But, even if 
humans are "beuer" minkel'S in this sense, it doesn't 
follow mat animals can't think at all. 
Carrumers' account of conscious mentality was 
supposed to render animal consciousness unlikely. It's 
tempting to maintain mat if a meory of consciousness 
implies something we know to be false-we know 
animals are sometimes conscious of their pains-then 
we have a good reason to reject that theory.25 But as far 
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as I can tell, there's no such implication in Carruthers' 
own account of consciousness: there's no argument for 
the implausibility of animals thinking about their 
experience.26 Perhaps Carruthers takes this to be 
implausible because he has an overly intellectualized 
notion of just what it is for a creature to think. If we 
suppose it's true that higher-order mental states are 
necessary to explain how some states can be conscious, 
whether we call such higher order states thoughts or 
beliefs or something else, it is clear that not much 
mentality is required for an organism to be conscious 
of its sense-experiences.27 That is, a second-order 
mental state need not involve much cognitive 
complexity. There is no non-question-begging way to 
claim that since consciousness necessitates higher-order 
states, animals cannot be conscious.28 If the best theory 
of consciousness says that consciousness must involve 
second-order mental states, and the best evidence 
indicates that animals are conscious, then animals must 
be capable of at least some higher-order mental states, 
however modest these may be. 
Carruthers shares a widely held philosophical 
opinion that the capacity to think is dependent upon 
the capacity to use language.29 This is why we are to 
believe Mary when she tells us that she feels no pain 
while she engages in pain-behavior. But Mary's case 
presents us with conflicting evidence as to Mary's 
sentient states, linguistic behavior and non-linguistic 
pain behavior, and so it's not easy to decide whether to 
believe that Mary is in pain. She tells us that she is not, 
but perhaps her agony has confused her speech. 
Carruthers assumes that we should believe her words 
and not her behavior. I see no reason to accept Illis 
assumption. And in the case of creatures without 
language, we don't have to decide between competing 
evidence in this way. We don't have pain behavior 
indicating one thing and linguistic behavior indicating 
another. In the absence, therefore, of evidence to Ille 
contrary, the attribution of conscious pain to animals 
engaging in pain-behavior is nonnally well-warranted. 
Indeed, in many instances of conflict, behavioral 
evidence could outweigh linguistic. Suppose Mary tells 
you "I am in pain," but exhibits no olller behavioral 
evidences of pain. The absence of the behavioral 
evidence might, no doubt, lead us to doubt her words. 
But the writhing and screams of a one-year old child, 
or a Iamb, is evidence only a philosopher could ignore. 
Carruthers and HalTison have correctly recognized the 
centrality of conscious pain for Ille moral status of 
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animals, but their arguments fall short of showing that 
animal pain is not conscious. In spite of tile recent 
Cartesian revival, animals remain appropriate objects 
for moral concern and sympathy. 
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